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Louise Kennefick* 
1. Introduction 
 
The landscape of criminal justice is in flux; however, little has been said as to how recent 
developments correlate with current discourse in criminal law theory. The rise of such 
movements as restorative justice, holistic justice and therapeutic jurisprudence has resulted in a 
shift within the criminal justice sphere.1 Traditional, punitive approaches have given way to more 
practical schemes, such as diversion schemes and problem-solving courts, which seek to engender 
empathy for those individuals who find themselves embroiled in the criminal justice system, and 
pay heed to the emotionality and vulnerability inherent in such situations. This essay will focus 
on therapeutic jurisprudence, in particular, as one methodology which provides a lens through 
which a more holistic approach to law may be taken. It argues that the concept can provide a 
normative link between emerging, more contextualised theories of criminal law, and the practices 
and techniques employed within the criminal justice system. In doing so, it examines current 
trends in criminal law theory which put the ‘real world’ individual to the fore, and which seek to 
address the disconnect inherent in the traditional, Kantian supposition. It does not argue for a 
general, overarching theory which spans the realms of criminal law and criminal justice, but 
recognises that for criminal law theory to remain relevant it must reflect, to some degree, the 
practices and techniques currently at play in the criminal justice system. 
 
The forbearers of therapeutic jurisprudence describe it as the ‘study of the role of the law as a 
therapeutic agent’ (Wexler and Winick, 1996: xvii). The concept emerged in the late 1980s as a 
theory of mental health law.2 (Wexler, 1990, 2013; Wexler and Winick, , 1991a, 1991b, 1996). 
The scope of therapeutic jurisprudence has since expanded to apply to most areas of law, and has 
shown particular promise within criminal justice process and procedure. Within that remit, its 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Law, National University of Ireland Maynooth. 
1 Such movements have been referred to by Susan Daicoff as ‘vectors’ of what she has coined the ‘Comprehensive Law 
Movement’. Other vectors include preventative law, procedural justice, integrated law, facilitative mediation, 
transformative mediation, collaborative law and creative problem-solving. (Daicoff, 2000: 465-92). For discussion of the 
similarity between restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence, see Braithwaite (2002). 
2 For a detailed account of the emergence of therapeutic jurisprudence, see Wexler, 2013a. 
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intention is not to replace traditional approaches to criminal justice, but to bring to light the fact 
that it is somewhat ‘...anachronistic to use a system oriented around themes of retribution, 
punishment, deterrence, and protection to address individuals more mentally afflicted than 
criminally motivated ... .’ (Schneider, Bloom and Heerema, 2007:43). (The latter sentiment could 
equally apply to those with drug and alcohol issues and other social difficulties). Thus, the aim of 
a therapeutic approach to criminal justice is not to usurp conventional principles of punishment, 
but to operate within such a framework in order to have a more appropriate impact on the 
offender (Schneider, et al., 2007: 43-46).  
 
The traditional principles of punishment (particularly retribution) to which therapeutic 
jurisprudence provides an alternative, emerge from a view of the individual as a rational, self-
contained entity. This approach is born from a Kantian, capacity based philosophy which 
continues to dominate criminal law theory. Thus, the prevailing view of the individual within the 
criminal law is grounded upon his3 ability to reason, without consideration of his social and moral 
context. Clearly, such an approach is at odds with the spirit of therapeutic jurisprudence in terms 
of practice and technique. But is there an alternative conception - one which shares the values of 
therapeutic jurisprudence - that can challenge the capacity based view of the individual on a 
theoretical level? In recent years, a wave of scholarship has emerged which possesses the potential 
to do just that.  
 
Dynamic theses, such as Antony Duff’s liberal communitarianism, Alan Norrie’s dialectic blaming 
relation, and Nicola Lacey’s socio-historical thesis, have breached the boundaries of the 
traditional, Kantian approach to blame and punishment. They seem to recognise, where more 
traditional theory does not,4 the fact that the individual is innately vulnerable to the environment 
from which he emerges. Though acknowledging that the scholarship in question may differ in 
substance, this essay employs the term ‘contextualised approach’ as a means of capturing the 
essence which is common to all. The core issue with such theories, however, is that by their 
nature, they do not tend to lend themselves to practical application. What is needed, therefore, is 
                                                          
3 This paper employs the use of the masculine pronoun when describing individuals and should be read so that the 
masculine connotes the feminine unless otherwise indicated. 
4 For example, see Michael Moore’s Placing Blame (1997) wherein Moore builds upon Kant’s philosophy with his 
defence of a functional nature to criminal law, the object of that function being retribution. 
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an appropriate mechanism whereby the spirit of such ideologies can have a tangible effect ‘on the 
ground’. 
 
The first part of this essay provides an overview of the traditional approach to criminal law 
theory, before seeking to capture the fundamental nature of the contextualised movement. In 
particular, it focuses on the scholarship of Norrie and Duff in order to show how such theories 
address the moral and social disconnect within the traditional, Kantian supposition. The second 
part examines how the capacity based approach is reflected in the criminal justice system. The 
concept of therapeutic jurisprudence is assessed with a view to establishing whether it can act as a 
framework within the criminal justice realm, whereby the contextualised approach to criminal 
law theory may be reflected in practice. 
 
2. Criminal Law Theory: The Kantian Supposition  
 
Notwithstanding the expansion of strict liability offences, the capacity based approach to 
responsibility has held its position within the field of criminal law theory. This is evidenced by a 
profusion of scholarship concerning what are regarded as the ‘core’ crimes for example, murder, 
rape and theft – all of which involve a strong mens rea element. Indeed, Nicola Lacey contends 
that this remains the ‘dominant way of thinking about responsibility in contemporary British and 
American criminal law doctrine’ (Lacey, 2007:236). Furthermore, Norrie (2007:252) alludes to the 
supremacy of the capacity based approach in his analysis of an historical account of criminal 
liability:  
‘... underlying all the twists and turns of history, there is this basic sense of a new liberal 
mode of legitimation based upon a ‘thin’ conception of responsibility, on the possibility of 
identifying ‘factual’ psychological mental states in all persons regardless of social class and 
status.’ 
 
Essentially, the capacity based approach assumes that an individual exercises a choice when he 
commits a crime. To have the ability to make a choice, an individual must be responsible for his 
own actions, that is, he must have capacity and independence. Thus, the law may respond to his 
rational status by applying a logical mechanism to a set of behavioural characteristics and 
circumstances, in order to validate the attribution of blame and the imposition of punishment. 
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Conversely, if an individual is considered not to have the capacity to make a choice, for example, 
by reason of a mental disorder, he is deemed not responsible and therefore not guilty of a crime. 
 
The capacity based approach derives from Immanuel Kant’s (1965, 1998) seminal theory of the 
abstract, universal individual, existing as a separate entity from his moral context. Such an 
individual morally relates to the rest of humanity on the basis of his capacity for reason, thus 
justifying the use of blame and punishment should this social contract be breached. According to 
Kant’s philosophy, then, ‘[w]hen ... I enact a penal law against myself as a criminal it is the pure 
juridical legislative reason … in me that submits myself to the penal law as a person capable of 
committing a crime... .’ (1965:100). The remainder of this section will analyse a core criticism 
pertaining to the capacity based approach, before outlining more recent arguments of theorists 
who envisage a criminal legal system which takes a more contextualised approach to blame. 
 
A deep-rooted theme of criminal law theory, even in the case of differing surface philosophies, is 
that the criminal law is built upon a moral core, whereby criminal responsibility is constructed so 
as to align moral responsibility with legal responsibility. However, this assumption is easily 
contested if the framework is expanded to include the legal individual’s moral context, as is 
demonstrated by Kant’s own examples of the soldier and the mother.5 Thus, while it may be 
accepted that the capacity based approach ensures a degree of equality for all those who come 
before the law, it also results in the ‘real’ moral and social context of the individual being ignored. 
The universal application of a set of rules based on rationality may bring a degree of certainty and 
order, however, it also brings with it social exclusion and moral anomaly. 
 
Dissatisfaction with the curtailment of the accused’s moral and social context within the criminal 
law is evidenced in practice. The courts, for one, respond to the strict constraints of the capacity 
based approach by tempering judgments with ‘policy arguments’ on a regular basis. Norrie (2005: 
125-126) argues that such a practice is due to the fact that judges are not entirely convinced by 
the traditional, capacity based approach to criminal responsibility. On the one hand, it has been 
argued that such occurrences are merely paying homage to the imperfect society we live in and 
                                                          
5 Kant was troubled by the fact that a mother who kills her child born outside marriage, or a soldier who kills in a duel, 
both commit a criminal act, but out of a sense of what their society perceives as ‘honour’. It is their respective social 
contexts and their own moral perceptions which have prompted their actions, not their ‘juridicial legislative reasoning’ 
(1965:107). 
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the concessions we must make as a result of that; on the other hand, it has been argued that it is 
simply not right, in a moral sense, to apply the traditional, capacity based approach in certain 
cases.  
 
Another example of the expansion of the moral context in practice is the supplementation of 
moral information in legal categories; for example, the partial defence of provocation in Ireland 
employs a subjective test when taking into account the mental state of the defendant.6 Norrie 
(2002:554) describes the above practice as a ‘particularising supplement’ to universal mental states 
such as intention and recklessness. For him, this practice acts to undermine grand theories of 
criminal law such as those advanced by Kant and Hegel,7 by supplementing them with a debate as 
to what constitutes good and what constitutes evil: ‘[i]n the debate around orthodox subjectivism, 
the particular is there as the moral contextualisation that says that this intention or recklessness is 
good, this is bad.’ (Norrie, 2002:555). 
 
It is discussed below how the underlying philosophy of the Kantian approach is reflected in the 
criminal justice realm by the ‘just deserts’ theory. The rise of such movements as therapeutic 
jurisprudence, then, is testament to the fact that though the Kantian approach may be plausible in 
theory, it does not fulfil the moral needs of society in practice. So while the traditional, Kantian 
approach may be under threat ‘on the ground’, let us consider the response of criminal law 
theory. 
 
3. Criminal Law Theory: The Contextualised Approach  
 
In terms of a theoretical reaction to the dominance of the capacity based approach, there has been 
a marked movement towards a more contextualised means of attributing blame. Scholars such as 
Norrie (1991, 1993, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010), Lacey, (1988, 1998a, 2000, 2001ab, 
2007ab, 2010), Duff (1990, 1991, 1993, 1998, 1996, 2002, 2007) have proposed alternative 
frameworks which, though varied in approach, all support an expanded view of the individual 
                                                          
6 The partial defence of provocation takes into account the character, temperament and circumstances of the accused. 
See D.P.P. v. MacEoin [1978] I.R. 27; D.P.P. v. Kelly [2000] 2 I.R. 1. 
7 Like Kant, Hegel was concerned with the notion of a unifying theory underlying experiential contents, however, his 
approach was more systematic in terms of making logic and therefore consciousness the ultimate source of reality 
(Houlgate, 1998; Miller, 1998).  
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within the criminal law. To capture the nature of this movement, this essay will focus on the 
hypotheses put forward by Norrie and Duff, in particular, as two seminal theorists in this field. 
 
In Punishment, Responsibility and Justice, Norrie (2000) argues that if the idea of fixed individual 
identity as promulgated by the rational legal code does not capture the nature of human being, an 
alternative code is required, one which is dialectic in character. The dialectic approach provides a 
challenge to the mode of thinking inherent in the notion of the fixed character of the Kantian 
individual by offering a critique of ‘false separation’, the basis of which is a means of 
understanding how socially connected, relational, individuals subscribe to an alternative model of 
legal and moral analysis (2000:12). Norrie (1991, 1993) builds upon an analysis that applies new 
methodological, historical, psychological, and ethical approaches to the liberal Kantian 
framework; the product of this is the idea of blame as a relational concept. 
 
It is clear, however, that Norrie (2000:13) does not wish to dismiss the notion of individual 
justice, but rather to recast it in a fundamental way. Therefore, his hypothesis aims not to make 
light of the notion of the individual, but rather to emphasise the dialectical concept that 
responsibility exists both in and beyond the individual moral agent in the same moment. 
Responsibility does not exist solely within the cognitive characteristics of individual, but is shared 
between that individual and the ‘significant others’ within his community (2000:14). So for Norrie 
(2000:14), while the Kantian mode of understanding responsibility (i.e. ‘reflecting and 
rationalising legal modes’) is falsely separative and non-relational, the Kantian question about the 
nature of responsibility still requires an answer. Thus, he argues that the Kantian focus on the 
individual within the criminal law is valid, even if its mode of understanding that individual is 
too narrow. The dialectic model redresses this restriction by retaining responsibility as an 
attribute of human agency, but in a relational way. 
 
Though Norrie is somewhat critical of the Aristotilean approach as promulgated by such scholars 
as Ashworth and Duff, it too asserts a view of the individual not alone as an autonomous entity, 
but as a member of a community of norms and values. Duff, in particular, offers an apparent 
alternative to the Kantian individualist model which seeks to clarify existing mens rea concepts 
against a backdrop of advocating the legal recognition of certain morally significant distinctions.  
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Duff’s hypothesis of criminal law is normative in nature, in that it relies upon a theory of the 
politic, or, as he puts it, ‘an underlying normative conception of the state and its proper 
relationship to its inhabitants’ (2007:11). Consequently, his theory is very much dependent upon a 
liberal-communitarian view of the criminal law which advances the notion of ‘a polity of citizens 
whose common life is structured by such core liberal values as autonomy, freedom, privacy and 
pluralism, informed by a conception of each other as fellow citizens in the shared civic enterprise’ 
(2007:11). So, like Norrie, Duff’s individual within the criminal law is concurrently a member of a 
moral community. A further aspect of Duff’s theory is based on the ideal of punishment as a 
means of communication. For Duff (1996, 1998), the purpose of the criminal process is to facilitate 
a conversation between the offender, the victim, and the wider community about the offender’s 
alleged wrongdoing. It is for the offender to explain his actions to the community, with a view to 
encouraging repentance; if his form of explanation fails, he will be punished for his crime (Haque, 
2008).  
 
Thus, despite their substantive differences, both Norrie’s dialectic blaming relation and Duff’s 
liberal communitarianism beget a common thread of interrelatedness, a recognition of the fact 
that the individual is inherently connected to his social and moral context. They stretch the 
Kantian paradigm by taking a more human and realistic approach to the individual within the 
criminal law, as opposed to the separate, rational entity that permeates formal criminal law 
constructs. That said, while Norrie’s relational theory of blame certainly reflects the reality of the 
position of the individual within his community, his pervading problem is that he fails to give a 
concrete practical example of how a relational, dialectical theory would work in a court room or 
within a body of legislation. Moreover, while Duff’s overall aim is indeed worthwhile, it is 
questionable whether he succeeds in blueprinting a system whereby the community and the 
individual seek to produce moral good from punishment. The core difficulty for Duff’s hypothesis 
lies in the practicality of rationalising the institution of punishment within a communitarian 
context.8 
 
Thus, one of the innate difficulties with such theories is that they are confined to discourse. This 
is understandable when we consider that, for the most part, the further we move from the safety 
                                                          
8 For a critique to this effect, see Norrie (2000:139) who argues that Duff struggles to retain successfully the notion of 
the autonomous individual, and ultimately fails to do so at the hands of his own, all consuming communitarian theory.  
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of a metaphysical theory of the criminal law towards its more tangible practices, the more 
problematic such theories become. But does this mean that criminal law theory is redundant? Not 
necessarily. Criminal law theory not alone provides the language by which our discussion of the 
criminal law takes place (Duff, 2005:364), but it guides, analyses and challenges the law, so that its 
purpose and motives may be understood to the degree to which any system of such magnitude is 
understandable. The point is that it cannot exist validly and usefully unless it engages with the 
techniques, practices and procedures that affect the individual within the criminal law (Naffine, 
2009:232). For, if we are to isolate theory from practice, the chances are that something important 
will be lost in translation. 
 
The next section examines how the traditional, Kantian theory to the criminal law is reflected in 
the criminal justice system, with a view to establishing whether the contextualised approach to 
criminal law theory may be realised in practice via a framework of therapeutic jurisprudence.  
 
4. Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Missing Link? 
 
It is accepted that there is no one, overarching aim of punishment. For, as Ashworth (2005:67) 
warns, trying to construct such an aim would be vacuous, ‘since it gives no hint of the conflicts 
that arise and the priorities that need to be determined.’ In fact, the aim of punishment is made up 
of rationales of sentencing, namely, prevention, deterrence, rehabilitation (utilitarian ideologies), 
incapacitation, and desert. The latter is based on a retributive theory of punishment, which 
arguably remains the dominant theory of punishment among both academics and policymakers in 
most common law jurisdictions (Moore, 1997; Law Reform Commission, 1996). 
 
It is the retributive theory of desert which connects the Kantian, capacity based approach to 
criminal law theory to the criminal justice system, by basing distributive principles on the moral 
status of offenders themselves, rather than on the community of potential victims (Hudson, 
2003:27). Its fundamental difference to utilitarianism, then, is that it looks to the past at the 
crimes previously committed by the offender, rather than to the future, and justifying 
9 
 
punishment on the basis of social advantage.9 According to the retributivist ideal, individuals 
possess free will and are capable of making rational decisions, thus punishment is an end in itself, 
rather than a means, for example, to protect society (Hudson, 2003:28). The foundation of the 
retributive ideal is that the offender is being given his ‘just deserts’ as a result of committing an 
offence, and so ‘paying the price’ for his actions. This is achieved through the vindication of 
society for the offence committed against it, the denial of the offender of his criminal gains on the 
basis of fairness, and the instigation of punishment proportionate to the offender and the offence 
(de Londras, 2004).  
 
It is arguable, then, that therapeutic jurisprudence is to the contextualised approach to criminal 
theory, as the retributive approach is to the Kantian, capacity based theory of the criminal law. It 
examines the notion of therapeutic jurisprudence and how it can connect criminal law theory to 
the ‘real world’, prior to considering an example of its manifestation in practice. In doing so, it 
shows how practices and techniques already in place demonstrate that therapeutic jurisprudence 
is a viable means of integrating the spirit of the contextualised approach.  
 
The concept of therapeutic jurisprudence provides a mechanism for expanding the contextualised 
approach to criminal law theory outlined above into the realm of criminal justice, in that it too is 
normative in nature. It holds that the concept of therapy is important and ought, therefore, to 
feature within the remit of legal decision making (Winick, 1997). It is important because it seeks 
to tackle the adverse experience of vulnerable offenders within the criminal justice system, such 
as, being the subject of abuse, experiencing lack of meaningful treatment if the individual has a 
mental disorder, and being subject to higher rates of incarceration (Schneider et al., 2007:45). Its 
particularised nature, too, accords with the contextualised approach, in that it regards the accused 
as innately connected with his social and moral circumstance:  
‘... therapeutic jurisprudence prescribes attention to the unique circumstances of each 
accused and recommends the use of treatment plans tailored to the individual... standard 
interventions exist only insofar as standard accused exist, which of course they do not.’ 
(Schneider et al., 2007:198). 
 
                                                          
9 Hudson (2003:17) maintains that the real difficulty with theories of utilitarianism lies in ‘...the contingency of liberty, 
and of individual rights. Protection of these values is contingent upon the self-interest of happiness-seeking persons 
being enlightened.’  
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In terms of its manifestation in practice, then, therapeutic jurisprudence forms the basis of several 
initiatives, such as mental health courts, diversion schemes, education of judges and legal 
professionals in a therapeutic approach, developing interpersonal skills of professionals when 
dealing with offenders with mental disorders, etc.10 As Schneider et al (2007:45) put it, 
therapeutic jurisprudence is ‘a holistic and all-encompassing approach’ not just in terms of how it 
permeates the stages of the criminal justice system,11 but also in the sense that it dissolves the 
divisions that exist in the current system as between behavioural sciences, social services and the 
criminal law, via the creation of ‘a climate that supports inter-professional collaboration and 
creative problem solving.’ (Madden and Wayne, 2003:340). Employing such a multidisciplinary 
approach thus ensures the achievement of a therapeutic experience for the offender in question, 
by means of the application of the knowledge, skills, and techniques of differing professions 
(Madden and Wayne, 2003:340). This methodology accords with Norrie’s approach, in the sense 
that his dialectic blaming relation crosses the boundaries of criminal law theory in order to 
appreciate the influence of such fields as history, sociology and psychology upon the law and its 
subjects. 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence attempts to deal holistically with cases involving difficult socio-legal 
problems. It works within the criminal justice sphere by partnering the processing of cases with 
treatment providers and community groups to provide follow-up and support for victims and 
offenders alike (Wexler, 1999; Balson 2013). In this sense, it shares the values of the 
contextualised approach to criminal law theory which regards the individual as innately 
connected to his circumstance. Therapeutic jurisprudence, however, takes the important step of 
getting the ‘significant others’ in the community involved with the individual in the criminal law 
process, so that the innate connectivity of the parties is recognised, not just in theory, but through 
various practices and techniques. Indeed, such a method goes some way towards bringing into 
practice Duff’s communicative ideal.  
 
Though as a concept, therapeutic jurisprudence enhances and makes more viable a contextualised 
approach to blame, it is not without its critics (Slobogin, 1995; Davis, 2003). A major difficulty 
                                                          
10 For a summary of practical approaches with a therapeutic jurisprudential leaning, see Goldberg (2005:3-6) and more 
recently, Ryan and Whelan (2012). 
11 As an example, ‘... from determining whether an individual should be diverted completely from the criminal justice 
system and placed with a mental health-care provider, to intentionally remembering some minor detail about an 
accused in an effort to make her feel a little more human ... .’ (Schneider, 2007:45).  
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perceived by some is the ambiguous nature of the term ‘therapeutic’, the problem being that 
therapeutic jurisprudence aims to encompass the ‘whole field’ of the law, thereby overextending 
itself (King, 2008: Part B). However, the fact that therapeutic jurisprudence does not seek to usurp 
the role of more traditional means of punishment in their entirety, goes to its flexibility as a 
framework, rather than suggesting that it has ambitions as a grand theory. Furthermore, such a 
criticism may be overcome by applying therapeutic jurisprudence in a particularised manner, for 
example, the juncture at which individuals with a mental disorder come into contact with the 
criminal justice system. 
 
It is also argued that therapeutic jurisprudence is coercive and paternalistic in nature (Casey, 
2004; Nolan, 2003), whereby, for example, treatment becomes a lesser evil to punishment thus 
eliminating any real sense of ‘choice’ for the accused (Casey, 2004). However, Wexler (1993:280), 
would dispute such a claim on the basis that the core task of therapeutic jurisprudence is to ‘... 
determine how the law can use behavioural science information to improve therapeutic 
functioning without impinging upon concerns about justice.’ Indeed, he is supported by 
Schneider et al (2007:63) who describe such a criticism as ‘absurd’: ‘It is twisted logic to suggest 
that we revert to traditional criminal justice sanctions, simply to avoid choice. If choice is capable 
of inducing coercion, perhaps it would be best to discard the traditional sanctions as options.’ 
(2007:64). More recently, Ryan and Whelan (2012) suggest practical examples of how therapeutic 
jurisprudence may be applied so that paternalistic interference can be overcome in the context of 
mental health courts, for example, with the appointment of a solicitor to act on behalf of the 
defendant at the first indication that he could be eligible to participate. 
 
Indeed, one example of a more prominent technique which encapsulates the contextualised 
approach is the problem-solving or ‘solution-focused’ court (King, 2009). Such courts are founded 
upon the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence and have developed in response to the realisation 
that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to criminal justice does not work in some contexts. Just like in 
criminal law theory, the traditional criminal justice model cannot handle effectively the 
complexity of certain human and social problems, and as such, initiatives have emerged that are 
designed to enable courts to respond more appropriately to cases in which complex social and 
personal issues are involved (Bahkt, 2005; Ryan and Whelan, 2012). 
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The essence of this innovation is that rather than merely imposing a sentence or making some 
other disposition, the trial judge remains involved with the case and exercises some degree of 
oversight or supervision over the progress of the offender (O’Malley, 2006:408). This, in turn, 
requires substantial collaboration with social services agencies which must also be willing to work 
with the offender. The principal characteristic of such a court involves using court authority to:  
‘... forge new responses to chronic social, human and legal problems that have proven 
resistant to conventional solutions. They seek to broaden the focus of legal proceedings, 
from simply adjudicating past facts and legal issues to an early intervention into the 
behaviour of litigants.’ (CPS, 2005). 
 
Though further empirical investigation is required, it would appear from research conducted to 
date that problem-solving courts can achieve considerable success (Schwartz, 2008; Sarteschi et al 
2011). The idea is clearly transferable to any jurisdiction, but other agencies must be willing to 
cooperate, and the resources and facilities must be provided to ensure that offenders are given 
every reasonable opportunity to address the problems leading to their offending (O’Malley, 
2006:408). As just one example of the practice of therapeutic jurisprudence, it demonstrates that 
the ideals of the contextualised approach to criminal law theory may be brought to fruition ‘on 
the ground’.  
 
More recently, therapeutic jurisprudence scholars have given significant consideration to the 
relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence in a broader sense,12 and the adversarial system of 
law (Freiberg, 2001; Balson, 2013).13 Stobbs, for one, has investigated whether therapeutic 
jurisprudence is incommensurable with the traditional adversarial approach in the context of 
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions (Stobbs, 2013). He asserts that while the two may 
be incommensurable, the notion of a ‘therapeutic paradigm shift in law’ is conceivable if the 
incommensurable nature of the relationship is related to a ‘broader disciplinary matrix’. Thus, the 
influence of therapeutic jurisprudence on mainstream criminal justice is likely to evolve in 
response to the needs and intuitions of practitioners when faced with seemingly intractable 
                                                          
12 Though note that most therapeutic jurisprudence scholars would argue that it is not yet a normative theoretical 
framework, for example, see Wexler’s useful wine and bottles analogy, where therapeutic jurisprudence practices 
amount to a ‘liquid’ and the mainstream legal rules as ‘bottles’ (Wexler, 2013b).  
13 Note the ongoing international project to ‘mainstream’ therapeutic jurisprudence, ‘Integrating the Healing Approach 
to Criminal Law’, which forms part of the Innovating Justice platform of the Hague Institute for the 
Internationalisation of Law, see further, http://www.hiil.org/insight/integrating-the-healing-approach-to-criminal-law. 
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problems in the current system, as opposed to arriving as a fully fledged philosophy with a 
preordained set of exemplars.14 Furthermore, whether the growing influence of therapeutic 
jurisprudence in mainstream practice will ‘rub off’ on the conception of the individual within the 
criminal law remains to be seen, but watch this space. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This essay has sought to give an overview of how the conception of therapeutic jurisprudence as 
applied to criminal justice provides the normative link between a contextualised view of the 
individual within criminal law theory, and the practices and techniques at play in the criminal 
justice system. Because therapeutic jurisprudence ‘... strives to be a vehicle that elicits a more 
nuanced societal response to proscribed behaviour’ (Schneider et al., 2007:3), it has the potential 
to facilitate the practical manifestation of the contextualised approach, the purpose of both being 
to narrow the divide between the offender and his social and moral context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Such evolution may be seen in the changing role of the defence lawyer. For example, Dale Dewhurst argues that 
lawyers need to take a more comprehensive (and arguably contextualised) approach in order to properly identify their 
client’s ‘actual best interests’ and to provide the most appropriate legal advice, for example, by referring  to the expertise 
of other professionals during case planning (Dewhurst, 2013). 
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